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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Michael Osborn pled guilty to five felonies and one misdemeanor, and he was sentenced
to a total unified term of 36 years, with 17 years fixed. Mr. Osborn filed a timely petition for
post-conviction relief asserting, in part, that his guilty pleas were not knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily entered into, as they were induced by his attorney's threat to withdraw as counsel
if he did not go along with the plea agreement. The district court granted the State's motion for
summary dismissal on this issue based upon the court's review of the answers Mr. Osborn
provided in his guilty plea advisory form and during his entry of plea hearing, wherein
Mr. Osborn did not reveal his trial counsel's threats. Mr. Osborn asserts that the district court
erred when it granted the State's motion because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether Mr. Osborn's guilty plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered into.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In August of 2016, the State filed an Information charging Mr. Osborn with robbery,
aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer, use of a firearm during the commission of a
crime, unlawful possession of a firearm, two counts of intimidating a witness, and misdemeanor
resisting and obstructing a law enforcement officer. (R., pp.151-54.) Pursuant to an agreement
with the State involving both this case and a separate robbery case, Mr. Osborn plead guilty to
burglary, aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer, unlawful possession of a firearm, two
counts of intimidating a witness, and petit theft, and he was sentenced to a unified term of 36
years, with 17 years fixed. (R., pp.332-53.) 1

1

In the companion case, Mr. Osborn was originally charged with robbery but he pled guilty to
amended charges of burglary and grand theft, and he was sentenced to a total unified term of 24
1

Mr. Osborn filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction relief asserting various
grounds for relief, including a claim that his guilty plea was induced by his retained attorney's
threat to withdraw without refunding his money.

(R., pp.7-13.)

The district court granted

Mr. Osborn's request for counsel and Mr. Osborn filed an amended petition for post-conviction
relief, substituting for Mr. Osborn's original pro se filing.

(R., pp.14-17, 47, 197-204.)

Mr. Osborn alleged that his retained attorney was ineffective "in that he acquiesced to a plea of
guilty in this matter knowing Petitioner was not making his plea knowingly, intelligently and
voluntarily." (R., p.199.) Mr. Osborn explained that he had "potential defenses in this case that
were ignored due to Trial Counsel's desire to resolve both cases at the same time," that he
"expressed significant reservation moving forward with his guilty plea in this case," and that
"Trial Counsel responded by threatening to withdraw as counsel of record if Petitioner did not go
along with the plea agreement." (R., p.200.) Mr. Osborn further asserted that his "plea colloquy
and guilty plea form did not accurately reflect his state of mind at the time of his plea."
(R., p.201.)2
The State filed an answer, a motion for summary disposition, and a brief in support of
their motion for summary disposition. 3 (R., pp.139-42, 156-71.) The State recognized that

years, with 17 years fixed, to run concurrently with the sentence imposed in the case that resulted
in this post-conviction appeal. (R., pp.354-77.)
2
Mr. Osborn raised additional claims of ineffective assistance of counsel that were summarized
by the State as counsel misinforming Mr. Osborn about what one of his witnesses was prepared
to testify to; that counsel failed to disclose that the burglary victim faced a pending charge of
violence; that a witness was prepared to testify that Mr. Osborn had no intent to steal; that trial
counsel "never acknowledged his statement that he did not aim or fire the weapon"; and that his
counsel "did not discuss the 'facts of the assault charge relating to proof."' (R. p.157.)
Mr. Osborn does not challenge the district court's order granting summary dismissal of these
claims in this appeal.
3
Mr. Osborn filed a motion for leave to amend his petition for post-conviction relief along with
his amended petition, and the State filed an answer, a motion for summary disposition, and a
brief in support of summary disposition. (R., pp.58-68, 139-42, 156-71.) However, the district
2

Mr. Osborn asserted ineffective assistance of counsel based upon his claim that "his attorney
threatened to withdraw from representing him if he did not plead guilty." (R., p.157.) The State
argued that this claim is disproven by statements Mr. Osborn made in his guilty plea advisory
form and during his entry of plea hearing, wherein he indicated that "no one had threatened him
or done anything to make him enter the plea against his will." (R., pp.163-65.)
Mr. Osborn filed an objection to the State's motion for summary dismissal in which he
noted that in the guilty plea advisory form, next to the question "[h]as any person including a law
enforcement officer threatened you or done anything to make this plea against your will?",
Mr. Osborn "made a mark over the yes answer but he circled the no answer." 4 (R., p.219.) In
response, the State filed a reply (R., pp.259-65) asserting that Mr. Osborn's post-conviction
counsel's only response to its motion for summary dismissal of this issue "was to request the
court [to] look beyond the record that disproves the claim," and argued dismissal is required
(R., p.261 ).

The State later filed an amended reply responding to additional evidence

Mr. Osborn presented in support of his motion, again arguing that his attorney-coercion claim
was disproven by the record. (R., pp.283-99.)
After holding a hearing (Tr. 9/20/18), the district court granted the State's motion for
summary disposition (R., pp.378-401).

The Court acknowledged that Mr. Osborn asserted that

his "trial counsel threatened to withdraw to coerce Petitioner to plead guilty." (R., p.388.) The
Court agreed with the State, finding that this claim was "disproven by Petitioner's written and
oral statements under oath to this Court" in which he indicated that he understood that he could

court did not grant Mr. Osborn's request to file an amended petition until after the State filed its
answer, motion for summary disposition, and memorandum in support, although the parties
agreed that State would not be required to re-file their documents. (R., pp.191-94; Tr. 6/13/18.)
4
The district court took judicial notice of the guilty plea advisory form filled out and signed by
Mr. Osborn in the underlying case. (R., pp.222-34.)
3

not be forced to plead guilty through threats, and that he was satisfied by his counsel's
assistance.

(R., pp.388-90.) The Court concluded, "[t]he Petitioner fails to show there is a

genuine issue of material fact that he was threat[ed]ed or coerced to plead guilty." (R., p.390.)
Mr. Osborn filed a timely notice of appeal from the district court's Final Judgment, granting the
State's motion for summary dismissal. (R., pp.402-08.)

4

ISSUE
Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Osborn's claim that his guilty plea was
involuntary as it was the product of his trial counsel's threat to withdraw?

5

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Osborn's Claim That His Guilty Plea
Was Involuntary As It Was The Product Of His Trial Counsel's Threat To Withdraw

A.

Introduction
Mr. Osborn asserts that there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his

guilty plea was voluntary. While the statements he made through his guilty plea advisory form
and during the entry of plea hearing indicate that his plea was voluntarily entered into,
Mr. Osborn's verified claim that his plea was the product of his trial counsel's coercive tactic of
threatening to withdraw from representing Mr. Osborn if he did not accept the plea agreement,
raises a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his guilty plea was, in fact, voluntary.
Therefore, the district court erred in granting the State's motion for summary dismissal of this
claim.

B.

Relevant Jurisprudence And Standards Of Review
A post-conviction petition initiates a proceeding that is civil in nature and, like a plaintiff

in a civil action, the applicant must prove his or her allegations upon which the requests for relief
are based by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 443 (2008).
However, unlike a plaintiff in other civil cases, the original post-conviction petition must allege
more than merely "a short and plain statement of the claim." Id. at 443-44. The application
must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting the allegations contained
therein, or else the post-conviction petition may be subject to dismissal. Id.
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought through postconviction proceedings. Thomas v. State, 145 Idaho 765, 769 (Ct. App. 2008). To prevail on a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must first show that trial counsel's

6

performance was constitutionally deficient. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984);
Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760 (1988). Where a defendant shows that his counsel was

deficient, prejudice is shown if there is a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466
U.S. at 694; Aragon, 114 Idaho at 760. Where a defendant enters a guilty plea based upon the
advice of counsel, "the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel's advice 'was
within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases."' Hill v. Lockhart, 474
U.S. 52, 56 (1985) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)). In order to meet
Strickland's prejudice prong, a petitioner who entered a guilty plea on the advice of counsel must

show that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Hill, 474 U.S. at 59.
A district court may summarily dismiss a post-conviction petition only where the petition
and supporting evidence fail to raise a genuine issue of material fact that, if resolved in the
petitioner's favor, would entitle him or her to the relief requested. Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 444.
"A material fact has 'some logical connection with the consequential facts[,]' Black's Law
Dictionary, 991 (7th Ed.1999), and therefore is determined by its relationship to the legal

theories presented by the parties." Id.

On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief

application without an evidentiary hearing, the appellate court must determine whether a genuine
issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions, and admissions, together with any
affidavits on file. Ricca v. State, 124 Idaho 894, 896 (Ct. App. 1993). The underlying facts
alleged by the petitioner "must be regarded as true" for purposes of summary dismissal.
Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250 (2009). Any disputed facts are construed in favor of the

7

non-moving party, and "all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are drawn in
favor of the non-moving party." Vavold v. State, 148 Idaho 44, 45 (2009).

C.

The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Osborn's Claim That His Guilty
Plea Was The Involuntary Product Of His Trial Counsel's Threat To Withdraw If
Mr. Osborn Did Not Acquiesce To The Plea Agreement Counsel Negotiated
Mr. Osborn asserted in his verified petition that his guilty plea was involuntary due to his

trial counsel's threat to withdraw from representing him if he did not accept the plea agreement
counsel negotiated, and plead guilty. (R., pp.199-201.) The State moved for summary dismissal
of this claim arguing that Mr. Osborn did not claim his guilty plea was coerced in his guilty plea
advisory form or during his entry of plea hearing, asserting that the record affirmatively
disproves Mr. Osborn's claim. (R., pp.163-65.) The district court granted the State's motion on
this basis. (R., pp.388-90.)
Contrary to the State's assertion and the district court's finding, Mr. Osborn's answers in
his guilty plea advisory form and during his entry of plea hearing, do not disprove Mr. Osborn's
verified post-conviction claim that his attorney coerced his plea through his threat to withdraw.
Instead, the State's reliance upon those pre-conviction statements creates a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether Mr. Osborn's post-conviction claim of coercion is true. The fact that
Mr. Osborn did not reveal his attorney's threat to withdraw during the entry of plea process does
not mean it did not happen - it simply means he did not reveal that it happened at the time he
entered his guilty plea. A defendant's failure to reveal ineffective assistance of counsel during
the proceedings in which counsel acts ineffectively does not disprove its existence, any more
than a domestic violence victim's failure to reveal the domestic violence during the time period
in which the domestic violence occurs disproves its existence. Thus, there exists a genuine issue

8

of material fact requiring an evidentiary hearing, and the district court's order granting summary
dismissal of this claim was in error. 5

CONCLUSION
Mr. Osborn respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order granting
the State's motion for summary dismissal of Mr. Osborn's claim that his guilty plea was
involuntary due to his trial counsel's threat to withdraw if Mr. Osborn did not plead guilty, and
to remand his case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on this issue.
DATED this 21 st day of June, 2019.

/ s/ Jason C. Pinder
JASON C. PINTLER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

5

Mr. Osborn acknowledges the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho
573 (1999), in which the Court rejected the petitioner's claim that his counsel was ineffective by
threatening to withdraw as counsel if the petitioner did not plead guilty pursuant to a negotiated
plea agreement. Mr. Osborn asserts the Hollon decision does not control the outcome of this
appeal for two reasons. First, in Hollon, the petitioner was afforded the opportunity to prove his
claim through an evidentiary hearing, and the Court found that he failed to present any evidence
that "there was insufficient time for a new attorney to be appointed who could adequately
represent him at trial or that [trial counsel] did not make him aware that new counsel could be
appointed." Id. at 576-77. More importantly, the State did not move, and the district court did
not grant, summary dismissal of this claim on this basis. Because Mr. Osborn has a right to
notice of the purported basis for summary dismissal and the opportunity to respond (see
Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 676 (2010)), and because "both the issue and the party's position
on the issue must be raised before the trial court for it to be properly preserved for appeal"
State v. Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95, _, 439 P.3d 1267, 1271 (2019)), Mr. Osborn asserts that the
district court's summary dismissal of this claim cannot be affirmed based upon the holding in
Hollon.
9
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